ABSTRACT. In the current era, governments are playing smaller roles in regulating workers' rights internationally, and transnational corporations (TNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in the struggle for workers' rights, and labour/trade unions have started to fill this governance gap. This paper focuses on the least researched of the relationships among these three actors, the union-NGO relationship, by analysing the ways in which it affects definitions of TNC responsibility for workers' rights at their suppliers' factories. Based on a qualitative study of the union-NGO relationship in the Swedish garment industry between 1996 and 2005, we propose that there are six main configurations of union-NGO relationships. By linking these configurations to their effects on TNC responsibility, we propose that co-ordination relationships between unions and NGOs, particularly high-commitment co-ordination relationships, are likely to result in a broadening of the definition of TNC responsibility, while conflictual relationships, both high and low commitment, result in a narrowing of the definition of TNC responsibility. The study indicates that co-operation is generally more beneficial for both unions and NGOs than is any form of conflictual relationship, in terms of broadening the definition of TNC responsibility.
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Introducing the union-NGO relationship
Integral to the ongoing internationalisation of business is the increasing impact of so-called transnational corporations (TNCs) (e.g., Anderson and Cavanagh, 1996; Korten, 2001) . One result of this development has been a set of new challenges regarding TNC responsibility for workers' rights at their suppliers' factories -a subset of the broader dialogue regarding TNCs' social responsibility. These challenges arose in the 1990s after TNCs experienced legitimacy crises due to extensive NGO and union campaigns and various media 'scandals' related to the working conditions at their suppliers' factories (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Roberts, 2003; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001) . In response to the criticism, TNCs started to extend their responsibility for workers' rights at their suppliers' factories in developing countries (Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999; Kolk and van Tulder, 2002; Radin, 2004; Sethi, 2002) . The main actors involved in specifying and defining this extended sense of responsibility were TNCs, NGOs active in promoting workers' rights, and labour/trade unions (e.g., Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Frenkel and Scott, 2002; Prieto and Quinteros, 2004; Sullivan, 2003) . Hence, these specification and definition processes can be characterised as instances of 'governance without government', aimed at filling the governance gaps left by governmental retreat from international issues of corporate responsibility (Beck, 1992; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Strange, 1996) .
As instances of governance without government have become increasingly common, academic interest in these phenomena has grown. The relationship between TNCs and NGOs seems to be particularly 'fashionable' in corporate responsibility research (e.g., Argenti, 2004; Hamann and Acutt, 2004; Henriques, 2001; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Teegen et al., 2004) . Issues regarding the relationship between TNCs and unions have also attracted extensive research attention in the management literature (e.g., Piazza, 2002; Weston and Lucio, 1998; Wills, 2002) , though they have been virtually absent from the corporate responsibility and business ethics literature (Leahy, 2001; Michalos, 1997) . However, the third relationship, the one between NGOs and unions, has attracted little research interest. What little relevant research there has been has mainly comprised reflections of practitioners involved in the relationships (e.g., Hale, 2004; Ortez, 2004; Simpkins, 2004) or conceptual papers (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004) , leading to a lack of empirically grounded knowledge of the nature and characteristics of the relationships between unions and NGOs. In addition, the effect of union-NGO relationships on definitions of corporate responsibility has been almost completely ignored. While several authors have noted the potential importance of union-NGO relationships regarding the definition of TNC responsibility for workers' rights at suppliers' factories (e.g., Eade, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; O'Rourke, 2003) , few authors have approached the subject systematically. The frequency and importance of these union-NGO relationships will also likely increase in the future (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Eade, 2004; Hale, 2004) , since the number of NGOs active in workers' rights has grown significantly in recent decades (Boli and Thomas, 1999) and unions have been struggling with declining membership and reduced political and economic influence (Connor, 2004; Eade, 2004; Wills, 1998) . Hence, NGOs are emerging as alternative representatives of workers' rights, alongside unions. This paper addresses this research gap by analysing what effects, if any, union-NGO relationships have on the definition of TNC social responsibility. In answering this question, we make use of an explorative study of the evolving responsibility of Swedish garment retailers for workers' rights at their suppliers' factories between 1996 and 2005 (Ä hlström and Egels-Zandén, 2005). We demonstrate that the relationship between unions and NGOs can be expected to be pivotal for the definition of TNC responsibility for workers' rights. By explicitly focusing on the relationship between NGOs and unions, and its impact on TNC responsibility, we also hope to contribute to a better understanding of the role of unions in the field of business ethics.
In the next section, we construct a preliminary frame of reference for the union-NGO relationship, as derived from previous research. Then, we provide a chronological description of how the union-NGO relationship has affected TNC responsibilities in the studied case. Based on this, in the final sections of the paper we categorise available union-NGO relationship strategies, and link these to predicted effects on TNC responsibility. This enables us to arrive at several propositions regarding the effect of union-NGO relationships on TNC responsibilities.
Framing the union-NGO relationship
Based on a review of previous research into union-NGO relationships, we argue that there are two distinct outlooks on these relationships: (i) conflict and competition, and (ii) co-ordination and co-operation. In the first, the relationships are constructed as detrimental and essentially cannibalising workers' rights. Here, NGO activities are seen as substituting for union activities. Roman (2004), for example, claims that NGO involvement in workers' rights issues risks crowding out union involvement. Likewise, Lipschutz (2004) describes NGO involvement as undermining and delaying 'proper' legal regulation of workers' rights. The argument underlying this outlook is based on the notion that workers' rights and interests can only be protected through collective bargaining and legal institutions, not by rights unilaterally extended to workers by TNCs (e.g., Justice, 2003) . The second outlook, in contrast, argues that NGO activities complement union activities. This viewpoint holds that unions and NGOs
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